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NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Criminal Law-Homicrde-Prosecutions for Motor Vehicle Homicide
The advent of the automobile brought into existance another means
by which a person can be killed and homicide committed. In 1952
there were 38,000 deaths from motor vehicle accidents in the United
States, 319 of them occurring in Nebraska. Add these deaths to an-
other 1,350,000 injuries," many later resulting in death, and it is ob-
vious that the law of homicide must be adjusted to meet the social
problem created by the culpable driver.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the history of criminal
prosecutions for deaths arising out of automobile accidents and to
compare prosecutions under the manslaughter statute2 with those un-
der the Motor Vehicle Homicide Act which was enacted by the Ne-
braska Legislature in 1949.
3
Except in the rare instance where a driver intentionally kills an-
other, using an automobile as a weapon, the crime of murder is in-
applicable even though the driver was reckless or violating the law.
Although theoretically the common law concept of malice aforethought
is elastic enough to include wanton misconduct 4 or an act which is
immently dangerous to others and which evinces a depraved mind,
in actual practice the homicidal motorist has been charged with man-
slaughter.G
Manslaughter is usually defined as the unlawful killing of another
without malice aforethought and generally involves either criminal
negligence or a killing which occurs during the course of the com-
mission of an otherwise unlawful act.6 The inherent difficulty in ap-
plying a manslaughter statute to automobile accidents arises due to the
fact that traffic violations and negligent driving are ubiquitous, and
such conduct is engaged in by otherwise reputable citizens. 7 More-
over, the ambiguties of the negligence formula and the vagaries of
proximate cause have added confusion and uncertainty to man-
slaughter prosecutions for negligent homicide.
Another difficulty in charging homicide in accident cases arises due
to the usual rule that contributory negligence on the part of the victim
is no defense for the accused in a criminal prosecution.8 In order to
mitigate the rigors of this rule, or to get around it, many courts have
sought refuge in the ambiguities of "proximate cause."9 This is done
1 Nat'l Safety Council, Accident Facts 43 (1953).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-403 (Reissue 1948).
'Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-403.01 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
'Holmes, Common Law 60 (1938).
In Nebraska, due to the wording of the manslaughter statute, the killing
must be done ". .. .purposely and of deliberated and premeditated malice."
1 i Wharton, Criminal Law 637 (12th ed. 1932).
See Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 39-701 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1953).
1 9 Huddy, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law 83 (9th ed. 1931).
'Note, 32 Neb. L. Rev. 72 (1953).
NOTES
by paying lip service to the rule that contributory negligence is no
defense in a criminal prosecution, but insisting that the unlawful con-
duct of the accused must be the proximate cause of the death and
instructing the jury so that it may find that it was the victim's own
negligence, rather than the violation, which brought about conse-
quences. If the jury so finds, there is an acquittal even though in theory
contributory negligence was not in issue and even though the violation
of law in fact may have been a substantial factor in causing death.
In many instances this is no more than double talk. For usually the
conduct of both the accused and victim were indispensible factors in
the sequence preceding the death.
In order for there to be a rational analysis of this problem it is
essential that proximate cause be distinguished from causation in
fact.' If there is no causal relation between the violation and the death
-if the death would have occurred anyway-an accused who is con-
victed of manslaughter is subjected to the most severe accountability.
Law breakers then act at their peril. The driver whose license plates
have expired or whose trunk is over loaded and who carefully runs
over a pedestrian would be guilty of manslaughter even though there
is no-or slight-causal relation between the offense and the death.
The speeder who is but a fraction over the speed limit and whose
automobile would have gone in the ditch anyway due to a blowout,
commits homicide when his passenger is killed. Because of the harsh-
ness of such a rule, which might send a man to jail even though he
could obtain a favorable verdict in a damage suit, it is understandable
that courts have insisted that there be a causal relation between the
violation and the death before the crime of manslaughter is made out.
Over and beyond insistance upon a causal relation, however, the
prosecution also may be required to establish that the violation which
caused the death was as well the legal or proximate cause of that
consequence. For example, although the violation was a substantial
factor in the concatenation of events, and but for the violation, death
would not have ensued, the connection may be exceedingly remote or
a person in the position of the accused might have been unable to fore-
see the presence of his victim or the risk involved. In such a case,
causation is present but due to policy considerations it may seem un-
just to impose a criminal sanction. Even though a death was caused
by the defendant's illegal conduct, it may not have been a natural and
probable consequence.
Thus it would seem that any one of three alternative approaches
to the problem may be taken. First, it may be held that a person takes
his chances when he violates the laws and is criminally responsible
even though the violation was neither an actual nor a proximate cause
"
0 Prosser, Torts 311, 321 (1941).
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of the death, and even though the victim was contributorily negligent.
Second, a court may insist that there be a causal relation, in fact,
between the violation and the death, but hold that remoteness and
foreseeability are not factors to be considered, and hence proximate
cause is not a prerequisite. Third, a court may insist that not only must
the Violation be an actual cause of the death but further that it be the
proximate cause in that the death was a natural and probable con-
sequence of the violation.
The Nebraska court has wavered inconsistantly in its choice of one
of the above alternatives. Prior to 1949, prosecutions for motor vehicle
homicide were brought under the manslaughter statute.1 The first
case decided by the court held that the contributory negligence of a
deceased which would be a bar to a civil action, was no defence to a
criminal prosecution for manslaughter. Moreover, the court held that
negligence, which must be criminal in its character, was the gist of
the offense.12
In a later case, the court in effect modified its holding on contribu-
tory negligence by requiring that the prosecution prove that the death
was a natural and probable consequence of the unlawful conduct. In
this manner, it was held that if the conduct of the deceased or another
was the proximate cause of the death, then the defendant would not
be criminally liable for the death.13
In another case the court said it was proper for the county attorney
to embody in the information any "unlawful" act on the part of the
offender which was the proximate cause of the death, meanwhile leav-
ing unanswered the question of what constitutes an "unlawful" act.14
In attempting to distinguish between an "unlawful" act which
would afford a basis for a manslaughter prosecution and an "unlawful"
act which would be disregarded, the court said that the mere failure
to have a driver's license would not be such a violation as would re-
place the criminal intent necessary to constitute manslaughter; but
where it is shown that a defendant had had his license revoked for an
earlier offense, the 'unlawful" act is serious enough to justify con-
viction.'5 This would seem to mean that it would be unnecessary for
the prosecution to establish that the illegal driving was the proximate
cause of the death.
To sum up the Nebraska cases, it appears that if a driver, by operat-
ing his vehicle with a reckless disregard for the safety of others,
proximately causes the death of another due to such criminal neg-
ligence, he'might be convicted under the manslaughter statute. More-
"
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-403 (Reissue 1948).
12 Schultz v. State, 89 Neb. 34, 130 N.W. 972 (1911).
1 3Fielder v. State, 150 Neb. 80, 33 N.W.2d 451 (1948).
1 4Crawford v. State, 116 Neb. 125, 216 N.W. 294 (1927).1 1Benton v. State, 124 Neb. 485, 247 N.W. 21 (1933).
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over, in some cases it is indicated that as long as there is a slight causal
relation between the violation and the accident, the death need not be
the natural and probable consequence of the unlawful conduct."0
In other states there have been two common approaches taken with
regard to motor vehicle homicides. In some states prosecutions are
under involuntary manslaughter statutes,17 while in others a negligent
homicide statute controls.18
Typical of the first approach is a California statute which states
that the death must be the proximate result of the unlawful operation
of a motor vehicle. With regard to the unlawful act, it is said that
its commission must be accompanied by gross negligence. Although
the emphasis is upon the unlawfulness of the act, nonetheless negli-
gence is required.19 Ostensibly, a somewhat different approach is taken
in states where there is a negligent homicide statute which expressly
states that gross or criminal negligence must be proved to establish
the offense. Here the emphasis is upon negligence rather than upon
the unlawful character of the defendant's conduct and authority is
found in the statute to apply familiar rules of proximate cause. In
reality, the net result may be the same under either type of statute,
for courts may supply the requirement of proximate cause even
though the legislature did not so specify.
In 1949, the Nebraska legislature passed the Motor Vehicle Homi-
cide Act.20 Instead of approaching the problem in terms of negligent
homicide, the legislature directed its attention to unlawful acts. In
substance the offense requires that: (1) the defendant must cause the
death, (2) without malice, (3) while engaged in the unlawful operation
of a motor vehicle.
The act not only leaves open the question as to whether the unlaw-
ful operation must be the proximate cause of the death, but also, by
its literal wording, the law extends liability to all situations where
See Schluter v State, 153 Neb. 317, 44 N.W.2d 588 (1950); Vaca v. State,
150 Neb. 516, 34 N.W.2d 873 (1948); Cowan v. State, 140 Neb. 837, 2 N.W.2d 111
(1942).
17 Smith v. State, 197 Miss. 802, 20 So.2d 701 (1945); Chandler v. State, 79
Old. Cr. App. 323, 146 P.2d 598 (1944); People v. Lynn, 385 1ll. 165, 52 N.E.2d
166 (1943); State v. Adamson, 101 Utah 534, 125 P.2d 429 (1942); State v.
Vinzant, 200 La. 301, 7 So.2d 917 (1942); State v. Hintz, 61 Idaho 411, 102 P.2d
63-9 (1940); State v. Graff, 228 Iowa 159, 290 N.W. 97 (1940); State v. Elliott,
1 Terry 250, 8 A.2d 873 (Del. 1939); Commonwealth v. Williams, 133 Pa. Super.
104, 1 A.2d 812 (1938); State v. Long, 186 S.C. 439, 195 S.E. 624 (1938); Largent
v. Commonwealth, 265 Ky. 598, 97 S.W.2d 538 (1937); Keller v. State, 155 Tenn.
633, 299 S.W. 803 (1927).
"
8Ex Parte Whitlatch, 60 Cal. App.2d 189, 140 P.2d 457 (1943); State v.
Yarmy, 244 Wis. 342, 12 N.W.2d 45 (1943); People v. Young, 20 Cal.2d 832, 129
P.2cT 353 (1942)- Cockrell v. State, 135 Tex. Cr. Rep. 218, 117 S.W.2d 1105
(1938).
"People v. Mitchel, 27 Cal.2d 678, 166 P.2d 10 (1946).
"Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-403.01 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
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a driver is unlawfully operating his automobile. At first blush it might
appear that strict liability has been imposed upon drivers unlawfully
operating their automobiles, no matter what the violation may be,
and irrespective of any causal relation between the unlawfulness and
the death. In other words, a literal interpretation of the statute might
mean that a driver who is in technical violation of some traffic law
but is otherwise driving carefully, or one'whose unlawful conduct was
not the proximate cause of the death, nonetheless may be prosecuted
under the statute.
The legislative history of the act is not too helpful. The committee
report on the bill does not clarify or illuminate the problem. How-
ever, the Chairman of the Judiciary Committee in reporting the bill
said, "This bill seeks to provide broader scope of punishment for cases
in which death results in connection with unlawful motor vehicle
operation." 21
If the above comment is taken at face value, it would seem that the
new law was intended to have a broader and more flexible application
than that which had been possible under the manslaughter statute.
Assuming, arguendo, that the law was not intended to cover a case
where there is no causal relation in fact between the unlawful opera-
tion and the death, there remains the problem of whether the statute
requires that the death be a natural and prabable consequence of the
unlawful operation. If it does not, then one would assume that there
is a broader coverage than under some interpretations of the man-
slaughter statute, and more convictions might be predicted. However,
the reverse is true. In the law's four years of existance, not one case
has reached the Nebraska Supreme Court. Out of 57 surviving drivers
from January 1, 1953 to September 15, 1953, only one was convicted
under the statute.2 2 Superficially, it would appear that prosecutors are
not resorting to the new legislation.
This dearth of prosecutions and convictions, however, in part may
be due to the jury instructions which are being given. The standardiz-
ed instructions adopted by the Association of District Judges of Ne-
braska are similar to those given in the past in some manslaughter
prosecutions.23 In effect, the jury is told that the prosecution must
prove gross negligence as distinguished from mere ordinary neg-
ligence; 24 that proof of violation of a traffic law is not conclusive but
is a circumstance bearing on the issue of gross negligence; 5 that un-
"Statement of Committee on the Judiciary on L.B. 510, Neb. Legis., 61st
Sess. (1949).
" Omaha World Herald, Oct. 6, 1953, Editorial Page.
"Standardized Instructions to Juries, 1953 Cumulative Supplement, 33 Neb.




lawful operation must be established; and also that it be shown "....
that such unlawful operation was the proximate cause of the death.
In other words, such death must be shown to have been the natural
and probable consequence of such unlawful operation of a motor
vehicle, and not of any indepedent cause." 26 It remains to be seen
whether or not the Nebraska Supreme Court will concur with this
interpretation of the new law and make the gist of the offense neg-
ligence rather than unlawful conduct.
Moreover, it would seem that ultimately there should be more
prosecutions under the new law than under the manslaughter statute.
Prosecutors may be more willing to prosecute and juries to convict
when the offense is characterized as "motor vehicle homicide" rather
than stigmatized as "manslaughter." But of much greater importance
is the change in sanctions. The manslaughter statute prescribes a
penalty of imprisonment for one to ten yearsY.2  The new act as alter-
natives provides for (1) fines not exceeding five hundred dollars, (2)
imprisonment in the county jail not to exceed six months, (3) im-
prisonment in the penitentiary for one to ten years, or (4) both fine
and imprisonment.2s The opportunity to choose between light and stiff
penalties is desirable due to the extreme differences which may be
presented by divers fact situations which have in common only the
circumstance that there was a violation of law which was a contri-
buting factor in causing death. The flexibility of the sanctions should
promote and encourage prosecutions and convictions of culpable
drivers.
There is also the problem of whether or not, in a flagrant case, a
prosecutor might choose to prosecute under the manslaughter statute
rather than under the motor vehicle homicide act. Under ordinary
rules of statutory construction, the later statute, which specifically
covers culpable driving, supercedes the older more general statute,
and by implication limits prosecution to the new act.29 However, if
the motor vehicle homicide act is construed as being limited to cases
where criminal negligence occurs and the manslaughter statute is
interpreted as extending to unlawful acts, regardless of negligence,
there might be an area where a prosecutor could choose the statute
to be utilized, depending upon the facts of the case.
It would appear that the transition from manslaughter to motor
vehicle homicide and construction of the latter offense as requiring
proof of a relation of cause and effect between the violation and the
death, and the further requirement that the death be a natural and
26 Ibid.
' Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-403 (Reissue 1948).
28Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-403.01 (Cum. Supp. 1953).
1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction 490 (3d ed. 1943); 2 Sutherland,
Statutory Construction 542 (3d ed. 1943).

